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INSURANCE LAW-PROPERTY INSURANCE:
ADOPTING THE EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE,
BUT SAYING NO TO CONTRACTING OUT OF IT
Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. University of North Dakota,
2002 ND 63, 643 N.W.2d 4

I.

FACTS

In April 1997, after a winter of record-breaking snowfall, Grand Forks,
North Dakota, suffered what has been referred to as a "500-year flood."'
Floodwaters penetrated the city on April 18, and evacuation of Grand Forks
east of Interstate Twenty-Nine, including the University of North Dakota
(UND) campus, was ordered on April 19, 1997.2 On April 20, 1997, the
City of Grand Forks shut down many lift stations, 3 including lift stations
twelve and six. 4 Lift stations twelve and six served twenty-two UND buildings, and when they were shut down, water entered the buildings through
the sewer system. 5
UND, located on the western edge of Grand Forks, incurred property
damage to all twenty-two buildings.6 UND sought recovery from its
insurer, Western National Mutual Insurance Co. (Western National), for the
resulting property damage. 7 Western National refused coverage and subsequently sought a declaratory judgment 8 to resolve the coverage issue in
Grand Forks County District Court.9
UND claimed that their "Boiler and Machinery Policy" (Policy) issued
by Western National covered the damage done to the boiler and machinery

1. Brief for Appellant at 5, W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 643
N.W.2d 4 (No. 20010118).
2. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, TJ2, 643 N.W.2d 4, 7.
3. A lift station is a wastewater pumping station that lifts water to a higher elevation. Telephone Interview with Gary Goetz, Wastewater Superintendent, City of Grand Forks Wastewater
Department (Jan. 15, 2003).
4. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 1 2, 643 N.W.2d at 7.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. T 3, 643 N.W.2d at 8.
8. A declaratory judgment act is a remedy under which "a federal or state law permit[s] parties to bring an action to determine their legal rights and positions regarding a controversy not yet
ripe for adjudication, as when an insurance company seeks a determination of coverage before
deciding whether to cover a claim." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 416-17 (7th ed. 1999).
9. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., T 3-4, 643 N.W.2d at 8.
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equipment of these buildings.10 The policy issued by Western National
covered "direct damage to Covered Property caused by a Covered Cause of
Loss," but excluded coverage for "loss or damage caused directly or indirectly" by flood "regardless of any other cause or event that contributes
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss."" UND claimed the damage to
its buildings was caused by sewer backup, and therefore, the policy
provided coverage because sewer backup was not excluded.12
To counter, Western National argued that coverage was not available
because the flood was the cause that set in motion the need for the lift
stations to be shut down and therefore was the predominant cause setting
the other causes in motion. 13 It further argued that even if the flood was not
the cause to be attributed to the damage, the insurance contract had a
concurrent cause provision which excluded damage that was "directly or
indirectly" caused by flood "regardless of any other cause or event that
contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss."' 14
After Western National's request for a declaratory judgment, each party made cross-motions for summary judgment.15 The trial court denied the
motions based on a finding that whether the cause of UND's damage was
sewer backup or floodwater was an issue of material fact. 16 In the liability
phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury, upon the court's adoption of the efficient proximate cause doctrine,' 7 determined that the flood was not the
efficient proximate cause and in turn found that the property damage was
covered by the insurance policy. 18

10. Id. J3. UND had flood insurance for four buildings near the English Coulee, as only
those had previously flooded. Brief for Appellant at 5, W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D.,
2002 ND 63, 643 N.W.2d 4 (No. 20010118); Brief for Appellee at 3, W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 643 N.W.2d 4 (No. 20010118).
11. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 3, 643 N.W.2d at 8. Such language is referred to as concurrent
cause language. Id. T 12, 643 N.W.2d at 10.
12. Id. 3, 643 N.W.2d at 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. 4.
16. Id.
17. Id. The efficient proximate cause has been defined as that cause that sets the other causes
in motion and is the predominant cause.

7 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON

INSURANCE § 101:57 (3d ed. 1997). In application, the doctrine means that an insurer must provide coverage whenever a covered peril is the efficient proximate cause of the damage or loss. Id.
18. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 5 4, 643 N.W.2d 4, 8. The trial
was bifurcated between the issues of liability and damages. Id. In the second phase of trial, the
damages phase, UND was awarded over $3.3 million as well as prejudgment interest and attorney
fees. Id. Western National made post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new
trial, which were each denied. Id.
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The declaratory judgment awarded UND $3,358,533.18, plus prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees.19 Western National appealed to the
North Dakota Supreme Court. 20 The court affirmed the trial court and held
that North Dakota has statutorily adopted the efficient proximate cause
doctrine and that the parties were precluded from contracting out of its
effect. 2 1
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The institution of insurance dates back to as early as 1601.22 Fundamentally, insurance is a contract through which an insurer receives consideration and promises to pay for the damage to, or loss of, something in
which the insured has an interest, provided the cause of the damage or loss
was a risk or peril covered by the insurance contract. 23 Insurance contracts
are contracts of adhesion; the contract is prepared by the insurer and
accepted or rejected by the insured without negotiation. 24
Property insurance, one of many types of insurance, was first employed
to insure primarily against the risk of fire. 25 Today, the modern field of insurance law, including property insurance, covers a wide variety of risks. 26
Because so many risks are contemplated by insurance contracts, causation
doctrines, such as the efficient proximate cause doctrine, are of particular
importance in property insurance. 27 Such doctrines aid in determining what
peril caused an effect.2 8

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. 1, 643 N.W.2d at 7.
Id. 5, 643 N.W.2d at 8.
Id. 20,643 N.W.2d at 13.
1 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1: 1 (3d ed. 1997).

23. Id. § 1:6.
24. EMMET J. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 169 (6th ed. 1992).
25. 10 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 148:1 (3d ed. 1997).

Historically, property of value, such as ships, buildings, and some commercial property, was made
of wood, hence the desire at that time for such items to be insured against the risk of fire. Id.
26. 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 22, at § 1:1. For example, one can now insure
against the risk of lightning, windstorm, hail, explosion, riot or civil commotion, smoke, vandalism, theft, falling objects, and weight of snow, ice, or sleet, among many others. VAUGHAN, supra
note 24, at 414-15.
27. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES: PRACTITIONERS EDITION §

5.5(e), at 559 (1988).
28. 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 17, at § 10 1:57.
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ORIGIN AND APPLICATION OF THE EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE
DOCTRINE

The origin of the efficient proximate cause doctrine is rooted in the
Latin maxim causa proxima, non remota spectatur.29 This maxim has been

widely interpreted to mean "the immediate not the remote cause is
30

considered."
In Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society, 31

the English House of Lords discussed this maxim. 32 In Leyland Shipping
Co., an insurance policy for a ship-covered loss caused by perils of the sea,
but excluded coverage for loss caused by hostilities or warlike operations. 33
The ship was struck by a torpedo and ultimately sank. 34 The insured argued
that the gushing of the water into the hole left from the torpedo was a peril
of the sea and thus coverage should be provided. 35
Lord Shaw noted that while the entry of seawater was indeed a peril of
the sea and proximate in time, it was not, as it needed to be, proximate in
efficiency. 36 Lord Shaw's often-quoted explanation of this concept explicitly rules out the possibility that the proximate cause is the one that is
nearest in time. 37

29. Rice v. Homer, 12 Mass. (230 Tyng) 230, 234 (Mass. 1815). In Rice, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts clearly indicated that it was applying the Latin maxim to the facts of the case,
but the court's interpretation of the maxim seems to differ from the interpretation that has since
become widely accepted. Id. The court decided that the maxim instructed it to attribute the loss
to the last peril that affected the vessel; courts later clarified such an interpretation as inaccurate.
See Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 302 U.S. 556, 567 (1938)
(noting earlier interpretations of the efficient proximate cause rule that found the efficient proximate cause to be the cause which acted last in time, but stating that such interpretations "cannot
now be supported"). The essence of this phrase first surfaced in the collection of legal maxims
published in 1630 by Sir Francis Bacon. John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, On Bacon's
"Rules and Maximes" of the Common Law, 76 L. LIBR. J. 48, 76 (1983). Its history before that is
apparently unknown. Id. at 52 n.25.
30. Tillery v. Hull & Co., Inc., 876 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11 th Cir. 1989).
31. [1918] A.C. 350 (H.L. 1918).
32. Leyland, [1918] A.C. at 369.
33. Id. at 350-51.
34. Id. at 350.
35. Id. at 353-54.
36. id. at 369-70.
37. Id. at 369. Lord Shaw's explanation specifically states:
To treat proxima causa as the cause which is nearest in time is out of the question.
Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or
links in a chain, but-if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to-it is not wholly so.
The chain of causation is a handy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Causation
is not a chain, but a net. At each point influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous, meet; and the radiation from each point extends infinitely. At the point where
these various influences meet it is for the judgment as upon a matter of fact to declare
which of the causes thus joined at the point of effect was the proximate and which was
the remote cause.
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The court held that the real efficient cause of the sinking of the ship
was the torpedo blast, which was an excluded cause, namely hostilities or
warlike operations. 38 This commentary by Lord Shaw was an early application of what has modernly been referred to as the efficient proximate cause
doctrine.

39

The 1868 case of Insurance Co. v. Tweed 4Owas an early example of the
efficient proximate cause doctrine at federal common law. 4 1 In Tweed, an
insurance policy meant to cover the damage or loss of bales of cotton in the
Alabama Warehouse excluded coverage for damage or loss to the cotton
from fire, including fire caused by explosion.4 2
An explosion took place in the nearby Marshall Warehouse, sending
burning debris onto nearby buildings. 43 The burning debris did not start the
Alabama Warehouse afire, but did ignite another nearby building, the Eagle
Mill.44 However, wind blowing from the Eagle Mill spread the fire to the
45
Alabama Warehouse within a half hour.
To determine whether the damage was covered under the insurance
contract, the Court assessed whether the fire occurred because of the explosion. 46 Applying the principles of efficient proximate causation, the Court
reversed the lower court's determination of coverage. 47 The Court found
that the explosion "produced or set in operation the fire which burned the
plaintiff's cotton," and that the "influence [of the wind] in producing the
fire in the Alabama Warehouse was too slight to be substituted for the
48
explosion as the cause of the fire."

What does 'proximate' here mean? To treat proximate cause as if it was the cause
which is proximate in time is, as I have said, out of the question. The cause which is
truly proximate is that which is proximate in efficiency. That efficiency may have
been preserved although other causes may [in the] meantime have sprung up which
have yet not destroyed it, or truly impaired it, and it may culminate in a result of which
it still remains the real efficient cause to which the event can be ascribed.
Id.
38. Id.at370.
39. Id.at 369.
40. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 44 (1868).
41. Tweed, 74 U.S. at 52. Apparently, earlier United States cases have discussed the concept, but the Court noted that while "a great variety of cases" had been cited to the Court in review
of the doctrine, it would refrain from citing or discussing those cases because to do so "would be
an unprofitable labor." Id.
42. Id.at 44.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at51-52.
47. Id.at53.
48. Id.at 52.
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In Insurance Co. v. Boon,49 the Supreme Court again applied the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 50 Here, an insurance contract intended to
cover fire damage to a store and its contents excluded coverage for fires
caused "by means of any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or
5
of any military or usurped power." 1
In October 1864, Confederate rebel forces "drove the [Union] forces of
the government from their position, compelled their surrender, and entered
and occupied the city [of Glasgow, Missouri]." 5 2 The Union commander
ordered an officer under his command to destroy the stores in the city so
they could not fall into the possession of the Confederate forces. 53 Union
forces then set fire to City Hall before they fled the city. 54 The fire at City
Hall spread to other buildings and eventually set fire to the plaintiff's store,
55
destroying it and its contents.
In an attempt to determine whether the Confederate invasion or the
usurping military force caused the fire, the Court applied and clarified the
Latin maxim causa proxima, non remota spectatur.56 The Court explained:
The question is not what cause was nearest in time or place to the
catastrophe. That is not the meaning of the maxim causa proxima,
non remota spectatur. The proximate cause is the efficient cause,
the one that necessarily sets the other causes in operation. The
causes that are merely incidental or instruments of a superior or
controlling agency are not the proximate causes and the responsible ones, though they may be nearer in time to the result. It is only
when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is,
5
of course, to be charged with the disaster. 7 '
Based on its application of the efficient proximate cause doctrine, the
Court held that an excluded peril, the usurped power, was the efficient
proximate cause. 58 Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court's grant of
59
coverage.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

95 U.S. 117 (1877).
Boon, 95 U.S. at 130.
Id. at 127.
Id.at 129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.

59. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court again dealt with the efficient proximate cause doctrine in Lanasa Fruit Steamship & Importing Co. v. Universal Insurance Co.,60 although the Court referred to it simply as the proximate cause principle. 6 1 In Lanasa, a cargo of bananas rotted because the
ship transporting them was stranded due to a delay. 62 The insurance policy
covered "peril[s] of the sea," but excluded loss caused by "inherent vice." 63
The Court, noting that stranding is a peril of the sea, 64 cited Leyland to
support its interpretation of the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 65 This
interpretation was that the efficient proximate cause is not necessarily the
one that acted last in time. 66 The Court ultimately held that the peril of the
sea was the efficient proximate cause of the loss because it was the dominant reason why the cargo did not reach its destination, despite the fact that
delay had been the cause to act last in time. 67
Since the time of federal common law, many state jurisdictions have
employed the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 68 Today, the efficient
proximate cause doctrine is all but universally accepted and applied in the
United States. 69 Most states have applied the doctrine in the absence of any
statutory mandate. 70 Other states have either chosen to apply some other
principle to determine causation or have expressly denied adoption of the
efficient proximate cause doctrine.7 '
60. 302 U.S. 556 (1938).
61. Lanasa, 302 U.S. at 562.
62. Id. at 557.
63. Id. at 561-62.
64. Id. at 561.
65. Id. at 567.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 572.
68. Mark D. Wuerfel & Mark Koop, "Efficient Proximate Causation" in the Context of
Property Insurance Claims, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 400, 407 (1998).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Cavalier Group v. Strescon Indus., 782 F. Supp. 946, 956 (D. Del. 1992)
(recognizing the rule only when parties have not freely chosen to contract out of it); Koncilja v.
Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 528 P.2d 939, 940-41 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (same); Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 242 A.2d 749, 752 (Conn. 1968) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Phelps, 294 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1974) (same); Bettis v. Wayne County Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 447
N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 1989) (same); Findlay v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 116, 118 (Was.
1996) (same). But see Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963) (following the efficient
proximate cause doctrine in application of sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance Code).
71. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Snell, 627 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (declining to follow the efficient proximate cause doctrine, which the court referred to as the "concurrent
cause doctrine," because it is applicable only when the multiple causes are not related, dependent,
and involve a separate and distinct risk); Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life
Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 1986) (holding that an insured was entitled to recover from
an insurer where a cause of the loss was not excluded under the policy and that this was true even
though an excluded cause may have also contributed to the loss); Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. U. S. Fire
Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 857, 863-64 (Wis. 1979) (holding that where a policy expressly insured
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For the purposes of determining the legal background of the application
of the efficient proximate cause doctrine in North Dakota, reviewing California's discussion and application of the doctrine is important because the
states share a similar statute.7 2 In 1985, the North Dakota Legislature
passed sections 26.1-32-0173 and 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 74 Source notes indicate that these statutes ultimately share the same
75
derivation as sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance Code.
While the statutes employed by North Dakota and California are similar, it
is also compelling that they are the only states that have employed the doctrine statutorily instead of judicially. 76 Finally, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has said that California is persuasive where statutes to be interpreted
share a derivation common to California. 77
Certain key cases have largely contributed to the development of California's interpretation of the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 78 In Sabella
v. Wisler,79 the California Supreme Court first implemented the concept of
the efficient proximate cause doctrine.80

against loss caused by one risk but excluded loss caused by another risk, coverage was extended to
a loss caused by the insured risk even though the excluded risk was a contributory cause).
72. See W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 5 13, 643 N.W.2d 4, 11 (recognizing the persuasive authority of California decisions that interpret statutes similar to those in
North Dakota).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2002). "An insurer is liable for a loss proximately
caused by a peril insured against even though a peril not contemplated by the insurance contract
may have been a remote cause of the loss." Id. "An insurer is not liable for a loss of which the
peril insured against was only a remote cause." Id.
74. Id. § 26.1-32-03. "When a peril is excepted specially in an insurance contract, a loss
which would not have occurred but for that peril is excepted although the immediate cause of the
loss was a peril which was not excepted." Id.
75. See id. §§ 26.1-32-01, -03 (noting derivation from sections 26-06-01 and 26-06-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which in turn indicate that they are derived from sections 2626 and
2628 of the California Civil Code); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 2001) (noting derivation
from sections 2626 and 2628 of the California Civil Code). Ultimately, section 26.1-32-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code is the North Dakota equivalent of section 530 of the California
Insurance Code, and section 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code is the North Dakota
equivalent of section 532 of the California Insurance Code. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-32-01, -03;
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532.
76. See Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963) (following the efficient proximate
cause doctrine in application of sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance Code); see also
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-32-01, -03 (providing statutory provisions nearly identical to those in
California that effectuate the efficient proximate cause doctrine).
77. Werlinger v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 26, 30 (N.D. 1993).
78. See generally Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989); Sabella, 377 P.2d
889.
79. 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).
80. Sabella, 377 P.2d at 895.
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In Sabella, Wisler built a home on land with subsidence,81 which was
later found to have been caused by negligent workmanship. 82 Wisler subsequently sold the home to Sabella. 83 After four rainy years and no appreciable damage to the home, a sewer pipe began to leak from which water
flowed into the nearby earth for nearly three months. 84 The home sank in
many areas causing substantial damage to it and its foundation.85 Sabella
had an insurance contract that covered "all risks of physical loss" but excepted out of this broad coverage a lengthy list of perils among which were
"settling, cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements, foundations,
86
walls, floors, or ceilings."
The California Supreme Court interpreted the trial court's finding of
facts to say that uncompacted fill will naturally settle when such weight as a
home causes it to do so. 87 However, the impending potential consequences
of such an incident were triggered by the inundation of the wastewater,
which in turn caused the rapid earth compaction. 88 Therefore, the court
held that the rupture of the negligently installed sewer lines was the efficient proximate cause of the damage. 89 The court explained, "[W]here there
is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient cause the one that sets
others in motion is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the
other causes may follow it, and operate more immediately in producing the
disaster." 90
In Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,91 the California Supreme

Court clarified and refined the Sabella decision, stating that "some courts
have misinterpreted and misapplied our decisions in Sabella." The court
was particularly concerned with the outcome in State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Partridge,92 which held that a liability policy covered all
damage where one of the causes was a covered peril, even if that peril was

81. The term subsidence is defined as "the settling (of solid or heavy things) to the bottom,
formation of sediment, precipitation." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY § Su-Sz. (1970).
82. Sabella, 377 P.2d at 893.
83. Id. at 891.
84. Id. at 892.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 891-92.
87. Id. at 892.
88. Id. The trial court expressly found that the water caused the already unstable earth to settle rapidly, thereby causing the house to settle. Id. The trial court further found that the settling
was a natural result of the weight upon the foundation and the induction of wastewater. Id.
89. Id. at 895.
90. Id. (quoting 6 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1466 (1930)).
91. 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989).
92. 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
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not the proximate cause of the loss. 93 This was described as the concurrent
cause approach. 94
The court explained that cases subsequent to Partridge,which involved
third-party liability claims, had allowed coverage in first party property
damage cases by inappropriately using the Partridgeconcurrent causation
approach as an alternative to the efficient proximate cause analysis in
Sabella.95 The court noted, "This extension of the analysis in Partridge,a
third party liability case, allows coverage under a first party property
insurance policy whenever a covered peril is a concurrent proximate cause
of the loss, without regard to the application of specific policy exclusion
clauses." 96 The court did not agree with this analytical extension and
therefore sought to clarify it. 97
In Garvey, homeowners Jack and Rita Garvey had an "all risk" insurance policy for their home, which covered "all risks of physical loss to
the property covered, except as otherwise excluded or limited." 98 The exclusions included loss "caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any earth movement, including but not limited to earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, rising or shifting" and
losses caused "by ... settling, cracking, shrinkage, bulging or expansion of

pavements, patios, foundations, walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings." 99
The Garveys purchased this insurance policy in 1977, and the next year
they noticed that a house addition had begun to pull away from the main
structure.1 00 After unsuccessful attempts at resolving the issue of coverage,
the Garveys eventually sued their insurer. 10 1 The Garveys claimed that "although their policy excluded coverage for losses caused or aggravated by
earth movement, it implicitly provided coverage for losses caused by contractor negligence because negligence was not a specifically excluded peril
under the policy."102
The trial court, explicitly relying on Sabella and Partridge,stated:
[The Supreme Court] told me in Sabella that negligent construction can be a proximate cause. They told me in Partridgethere

93. Garvey, 770 P.2d at 705 (citing Partridge,514 P.2d at 123).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 704-05.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 706.
102. Id.
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may be coverage whenever an insured risk constitutes simply a
concurrent proximate cause of the injuries. Now, to me that is
crystal clear, putting those two causes together, that if negligent
construction is a concurrent proximate cause of the loss, there is
coverage. 103
Upon this reasoning, the trial court found that as a matter of law, the negligent construction was the proximate cause. 104 The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Garvey.105 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
appealed to the California Court of Appeals-106
In its own attempt to provide a clear framework for trial courts, the
court of appeals explained that whether the covered risk and excluded risk
are causes in fact should be a court's threshold inquiry. 0 7 The first part of
the rule announced by the court of appeals explained that if two independent causes result in damage, the Partridge analysis would apply; the
insured is covered if the covered risk was a concurring proximate cause of
the loss.108 The second part of the rule explained that if two dependent
causes in fact cause damage, the Sabella analysis would apply; the insured
is covered only if the covered risk was the proximate cause of the loss. 109
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of a
directed verdict. 110
The California Supreme Court granted review to consider the court of
appeals' reversal."' The court, explaining thatreview had been granted
merely to clarify and refine the decision of the court of appeals, acknowledged that the decision was on the right track but that the two-tiered
rule put forth by the court of appeals "failed to limit at the threshold the
application of Partridgeto the third party liability context."11 2 The court
explained that the confusion stemmed from the fact that the Partridgecourt
applied the Sabella analysis, which had been used in the context of a first
party property policy, to a claim that involved a third party tort liability
policy. 113

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712.

108. Id.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 706.
111. Id. at 704.
112. Id. at 712-13.

113. Id. at 709-10.
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Ultimately, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals, but refined the holding so that the analysis in Sabella
would be generally limited to first party property loss and the Partridge
analysis would be limited to third party liability cases.11 4 Finally, perhaps
most importantly, the court held that when sufficient evidence is presented
to support a finding that either of certain concurrent causes could have been
the efficient proximate cause, such a determination is a question for the fact
finder. 115
B.

THE EFFECT OF CONCURRENT CAUSE LANGUAGE ON THE
EFFICIENT PROXIMATE CAUSE DOCTRINE

To avoid the effect of the efficient proximate cause doctrine, insurance
providers have employed concurrent cause language.116 Such language
operates "to exclude certain perils from coverage if they are a cause of loss,
regardless of any other perils acting concurrently or in sequence with
them."" 17 Essentially, this means when a policy contains a concurrent cause
provision, the parties have expressed their intent to contract out of the
efficient proximate cause doctrine.' 18
Most courts have held that parties have the freedom to contract as they
choose and therefore may contract out of the effect of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.'119 On the other hand, only California and Washington
preclude parties from contracting out of the efficient proximate cause
doctrine. 120
114. Id. at 709-10. The court qualified its limitation of Sabella to allow for a Partridge
analysis in the unusual event that the Sabella analysis would not be useful. Id. at 713 n.9.
115. Id. at 714-15.
116. Wuerfel & Koop, supra note 68, at 407.
117. Id.
118. See TNT Speed & Sport Ctr. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 1997)
(stating that policy language which excludes "loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by [certain listed exclusions]" and then further provides that "[s]uch loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss" is
specifically language that "reflects an intent to contract out of application of the efficient
proximate cause doctrine").
119. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 314 (Ala. 1999) (holding
that parties may contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine "so long as they do not
offend some rule of law or contravene public policy"); Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., 768 P.2d 678, 685
(Colo. 1989) (noting that the efficient proximate cause rule is not controlling to the extent that it
must yield to well-established law; for example, the court will not rewrite a contract for the
parties).
120. See Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1458 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (applying sections 530 and 532 of the California Insurance Code and stating parties may not
contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine because of the statutory provisions); Safeco
Ins. v. Hirshmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. 1989) (prohibiting parties from contracting out of
the efficient proximate cause doctrine despite statutes that would allow them to). It is noteworthy
that while California has a statutory provision precluding parties from contracting out the efficient
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California's handling of the effect of concurrent cause language on the
efficient proximate doctrine is again relevant to this review. 12 In Howell v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,122 the California Court of Appeals considered whether or not concurrent cause provisions are valid. 23 Land and
property owner, Barbara Howell, had five similar insurance policies issued
by State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm).124 The Howell property
was located on a slope subject to landslides.125 A 1985 fire destroyed much
of the vegetation on this slope.126 Subsequent heavy rains coupled with the
27
loss of vegetation lead to a major landslide.1
All of Howell's insurance policies stated that certain perils were
covered but that coverage would not be provided where damage would not
have occurred in the absence of other certain events, including earth movement and water damage.128 Howell sought coverage for the damage her
property sustained.1 29 State Farm denied coverage, stating that the loss was
caused by perils, specifically earth movement and water damage, that had
been excluded under the policies. 130
Howell filed suit and State Farm countered with a number of affirmative defenses, including the exclusion provisions. 13 1 Thereafter, State Farm
moved for summary judgment, reasoning that Howell's policies did not
cover her losses based on the exclusion provisions.132 Howell replied that
coverage was appropriate because the fire, a covered peril, was the efficient
proximate cause of the damage, and California law did not bar coverage
where the efficient proximate cause was a covered peril.133

proximate cause doctrine, Washington does so in the absence of any such statutory mandate.
Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1458; Hirshmann, 773 P.2d at 416.
121. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, T 13, 643 N.W.2d 4, 11.
122. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, No. S015345, 1990 Cal.
LEXIS 2627, *1 (Cal. June 21, 1990).
123. Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1448.
124. Id. at 1449. Howell's policies included a homeowner's policy for her residence, three
identical rental dwelling policies for rental units, and a commercial policy for a kennel. Id. The
court noted distinctions among the policies, but held that those distinctions were irrelevant for the
purposes of the case. Id. at 1452 n.4.
125. Id. at 1449.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1449-51.
129. Id. at 1449.
130. Id. at 1449-50
131. Id. at 1451.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The trial court reasoned that Howell's loss was not covered because of
the exclusion provisions of the policies.134 Howell appealed and the California Court of Appeals heard the case. 135 The court of appeals phrased the
issue as "whether a property insurer may contractually exclude coverage
when a covered peril is the efficient proximate cause of the loss, but an
excluded peril has contributed or was necessary to the loss."136
To begin its analysis, the court looked to sections 530 and 532 of the
California Insurance Code.137 The court stated that while these sections appear to be inconsistent with each other, the conflict was harmonized by the
supreme court's decision in Sabella.138 Ultimately, the court held that such
exclusion clauses, where they operate to circumscribe the efficient proximate cause doctrine outlined in section 530, are unenforceable "to the extent they purport to limit the insurer's liability beyond what is permitted by
California law." 139
To support this conclusion, the court pointed out that other California
cases interpreted Sabella's articulation of sections 530 and 532 in accordance with the one the court reached.1 40 Further, the court noted that giving
effect to such exclusion clauses allows insurance companies to deny
coverage in nearly all cases.141
In sum, the efficient proximate cause doctrine may or may not be
effectuated depending on whether parties are allowed to contract out of
134. Id. at 1451-52.
135. Id. at 1448.
136. Id. at 1452.
137. Id. Section 530 of the California Insurance Code states, "An insurer is liable for a loss
of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the
contract may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril
insured against was only a remote cause." CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1993). Section 532 of the
California Insurance Code states, "If a peril is specially excepted in a contract of insurance and
there is a loss which would not have occurred but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted
even though the immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted." Id. § 532.
138. Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1452 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990). This apparent inconsistency, the court explained, stemmed from section 532's use of the
term "but for" and the contention that it meant that "where an excepted peril operated to any extent in the chain of causation so that the resulting harm would not have occurred 'but for' the
excepted peril's operation, the insurer would be exempt even though an insured peril was the
proximate cause of the loss." Id. at 1453. The Sabella court, noting that such an interpretation
would run directly counter to section 530, resolved this apparent inconsistency by construing the
"but for" clause of section 532 to mean a proximate cause of the loss and the "immediate cause"
language to mean the cause most immediate in time to the damage. Id.
139. Id. at 1453-54.
140. Premier Ins. Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 726-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (relying
on a causation analysis controlled by section 530 of the California Insurance Code and Sabella,
not the specific exclusionary language of the policy); Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 238 Cal. App.
2d 408, 417-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (same); Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1454 (citing Sauer v.
Gen. Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (same)).
141. Id. at 1456 n.6.
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California employs the efficient proximate cause doctrine, 43 holding
its determination is a question of fact' 44 and parties may not contract out of
its effect.145 North Dakota courts have considered California's treatment of
it.142

the issue to be very persuasive.t 46

III. ANALYSIS
Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. University of North

Dakota147 was decided by a unanimous court,148 which held that the efficient proximate cause doctrine had been statutorily adopted, and that a
property insurer cannot contractually preclude coverage when the efficient
proximate cause of the loss is a covered peril. 4 9 Justice Sandstrom delivered the opinion of the court.15o While other issues were raised by the

parties and addressed by the court,15 1 the focus of this comment will be the
court's recognition that the efficient proximate cause doctrine was adopted
statutorily and its holding that insurers may not circumvent the efficient
proximate cause doctrine by contract.1 52
The court noted that the interpretation of an insurance policy, being a
question of law, is fully reviewable on appeal, and that a policy is interpreted by independently examining and construing the policy.1 53 The court
relied on its reasoning in Ziegelmann v. TMG Life Ins. Co.1 54 for guidance

142. Id. at 1453-54.
143. Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963).
144. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 714-15 (Cal. 1989).
145. Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1453-54 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
146. Werlinger v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 26, 30 (N.D. 1993).
147. 2002 ND 63, 643 N.W.2d 4.
148. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 54, 643 N.W.2d at 20.
149. Id. 5 20, 643 N.W.2d at 13.
150. Id. 5 1,643 N.W.2d at 7.
151. Brief for Appellant at 1, W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 643
N.W.2d 4 (No. 20010118); see also Brief for Appellee at vii, W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of
N.D., 2002 ND 63,643 N.W.2d 4 (No. 20010118). The other issues briefed and addressed included: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that flooding was not the
efficient proximate cause of UND's damage; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying Western National's motion for a new trial based on proper trial and evidentiary rulings,
such as the mention of reinsurance, the jury instructions regarding proximate causation, and supplemental expert discovery responses; (3) whether recovery of pre-judgment interest was appropriate; and (4) whether recovery of attorney's fees was appropriate. Appellant's Brief at 1, W.
Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. (No. 20010118); see also Appellee's Brief at vii, W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. (No.
20010118).
152. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 20, 643 N.W.2d at 13.
153. Id. T 7, 643 N.W.2d at 8-9.
154. 2000 ND 55, 607 N.W.2d 898.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:561

on how to construe an insurance policy.1 55 The court's goal in interpreting
an insurance contract is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties
as it existed at the time of contracting.1 56 The court also noted that exclusions from coverage, unless clearly unambiguous, will be construed against
the insurer. 157

The court concluded that Western National had conceded that the policy provided coverage for sewer backup.158 However, Western National's
basis for denying coverage stemmed from the clause that denied coverage
when flooding "directly or indirectly" caused the damage "regardless of any
other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the
lOSS."159

To construe the insurance contract, the court explored the definition of
"sewage" and "flood" as it has been defined in various resources, contexts,
and other jurisdictions. 160 Based on the discussion of the different interpretations of these terms 161 and the facts as they occurred, the North Dakota
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's finding that there was a causation dispute and therefore a question of fact as to whether the flood or the
sewage was the cause of the property damage.162 The court also noted that

155. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.,

J 7,

643 N.W.2d at 8-9 (citing Ziegelman, T 6, 607 N.W.2d at

900).
156. Ziegelman, T 6, 607 N.W.2d at 900. To do so, the court looks first to the language of
the contract and looks for ambiguity. Id. If ambiguity exists, it will be resolved in favor of the
insured, but absent ambiguity, a policy will not be rewritten to benefit the insured. Id. Insurance
contracts are construed as a whole. Id.
157. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 7, 643 N.W.2d at 9.
158. Id. 9. The insurance policy provided coverage for covered losses, which included a
sudden and accidental breakdown that manifests itself by physical damage requiring repair or replacement. Id. 8. Therefore, while the insurance policy was not an all-risk policy, Western
National essentially agreed that if sewer backup was found to be the sole and independent cause of
the damage, coverage would be appropriate. Id. 5 8-9.
159. Id. 9.
160. Id. 10. Western National had not specifically defined flood within the provisions of
the insurance policy. Id. 9.
161. See Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., 768 P.2d 678, 680-84 (Colo. 1989) (discussing at length the
meaning of the term flood and ultimately deciding that the term is relative); State Farm Lloyds v.
Marachetti, 962 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App. 1997) (looking to the plain and ordinary meaning and
recognizing that flood water "has a terranean nature for water overflowing its natural banks as
opposed to water below the surface"); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 76971 (Wyo. 1988) (discussing the meaning of the term flood in insurance cases); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1640 (6th ed. 1990) (defining flood as inundation of water over land not
usually covered by it); see also WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 535 (2d College ed. 1980)
(defining flood as "an overflowing of water in an area normally dry").
162. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 11, 643 N.W.2d at 10.
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sewer backup has generally been recognized as a separate and distinct peril
from flood or surface water.163
Western National argued that the concurrent cause language of the insurance policy precluded coverage because the flood was a part of the series
of events that led to UND's property damage "regardless of any other cause
or event that contribute[d] concurrently or in any sequence to the loss."164
The court stated that insurance policies should be construed in the light of
relevant statutory provisions; therefore, the court determined that to address
such an argument would require an examination of the efficient proximate
cause doctrine and sections 26.1-32-01 and 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 165
Section 26.1-32-01 provides the following: "An insurer is liable for a
loss proximately caused by a peril insured against even though a peril not
contemplated by the insurance contract may have been a remote cause of
the loss. An insurer is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against
was only a remote cause." 1 66
Section 26.1-32-03 provides the following: "When a peril is excepted
specially in an insurance contract, a loss which would not have occurred but
for that peril is excepted although the immediate cause of the loss was a
peril which was not excepted."1 67
The court looked to the source notes of these statutes to determine their
derivation.1 68 The source notes indicate that the statutes were derived from
sections 26-06-01 and 26-06-03 of the North Dakota Century Code,169
which in turn were derived from sections 2626 and 2628 of the California
Civil Code. 170 The court recognized that California case law is insightful to
interpret these statutes because "many of our statutes share a common derivation from California;" therefore, "California decisions construing statutes
'are entitled to respectful consideration, and may be persuasive and should
not be ignored."'1 71

163. Id. 5 10, 643 N.W.2d at 9-10 (citing Front Row Theatre v. Am. Mfr. Mut., 18 F.3d
1343, 1346-47 (6th Cir. 1994); Old Dominion Ins. Co. v. Elysee, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 256, 261 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1997); Marachetti, 962 S.W.2d at 60-61).
164. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., T 12, 643 N.W.2d at 10.
165. Id.
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-01 (2002).
167. Id. § 26.1-32-03.
168. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., T 13, 643 N.W.2d at 11.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Werlinger v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 26, 30 (N.D. 1993)).
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The court began its analysis of the California case law with Sabella.172
The Sabella court applied the efficient proximate cause doctrine to determine whether coverage was appropriate where concurrent causes, one a
covered peril and the other an excluded peril, led to the damage. 173 In
Sabella, the insurer argued that Sabella's damage would not have occurred
"but for" the excluded peril and therefore the damage was excluded from
coverage under section 532 of the California Insurance Code, the statute
which shares its derivation with section 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota
Century Code.17 4 The North Dakota Supreme Court was persuaded by the
175
Sabella court's handling of this issue.
The court in Sabella held that if the usage of "but for" in section 532 of
the California Insurance Code was construed to mean that where an excepted peril operated to any extent in the chain of causation so that the
resulting harm would not have occurred "but for" the excluded peril, it
would render section 530 of California's Insurance Code meaningless.I7 6
The Sabella court essentially said this could not be the case because the
interpretation of related statutory provisions should be harmonized.17 7 The
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed and applied the Sabella reasoning to
8
sections 26.1-32-01 and 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code.17
179
Next, the court looked to Garvey.
The court observed that Garvey
held a determination of the efficient proximate cause is a factual issue for
the trier of fact and that coverage for a first party claim should be determined under an efficient proximate cause analysis.180 The court agreed
with Garvey's rationale that when sufficient evidence is introduced to support the possibility that more than one cause could have been the efficient
proximate cause, that issue is a question for the jury.18,

172. Id. T 14 (citing Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963)).
173. Id. (citing Sabella, 377 P.2d at 895).
174. Id. (citing Sabella, 377 P.2d at 896-97). Section 532 of the California Insurance Code is
the California equivalent of section 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code because the
statutes share an ultimate common derivation in section 2628 of the California Civil Code. See
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
175. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, 14, 643 N.W.2d 4, 11 (citing
Sabella, 377 P.2d at 896-97).
176. Id. T 14, 643 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Sabella, 377 P.2d at 896-97).
177. Id. (citing Sabella, 377 P.2d at 896-97).
178. Id. (citing Sabella, 377 P.2d at 896-97).
179. Id. 5 15, 643 N.W.2d at 11-12 (citing Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d
704, 706-07 (Cal. 1989)).
180. Id. (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 714-15).
181. Id. (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 715).
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The court next focused its attention on Howell.182 The court noted that
in Howell, the California Court of Appeals held that an insurer may not
contract out of the effect of the efficient proximate cause doctrine by the
83
use of concurrent cause language, such as that used by Western National.1
The Howell court reasoned that to give effect to concurrent cause language,
the purpose of which is to contract out of the efficient proximate cause
doctrine, is to allow a result directly counter to that proscribed in section
530 of the California Insurance Code because section 530 itself mandates
application of the doctrine.184 Therefore, the Howell court concluded that
concurrent cause language is "not enforceable to the extent [it] purports to
limit the insurer's liability beyond what is permitted by California law." 185
The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the Howell court's position and
held that concurrent cause language was ineffective because the intent of
such concurrent cause language to contract out of the effect of the efficient
proximate cause doctrine was precluded by section 26.1-32-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code. 186
However, the court did point out that some jurisdictions have held such
language acceptable, allowing parties to contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 87 The court reasoned that the situation in North
182. Id. 1 16, 643 N.W.2d at 12 (citing Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App.
3d 1446, 1452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
183. Id. (citing Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1446). Concurrent cause language attempts to
preclude coverage as long as an excluded peril contributed directly, indirectly, concurrently, or in
any other sequence to the loss, regardless of whether it was found to be the efficient proximate
cause. Id. 5 12, 643 N.W.2d at 10.
184. Id. T 16, 643 N.W.2d at 12 (citing Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1452).
185. Id. (quoting Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1454).
186. Id. (citing Howell, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1453-54).
187. Id. 17 (citing TNT Speed & Sport Ctr. Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731, 733
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that exclusion language must be enforced in accordance with its plain
meaning)); Front Row Theatre v. Am. Mfr. Mut., 18 F.3d 1343, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that coverage is mandated by the language of the policy); Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers
Cos., 955 F. Supp. 9, 11-13 (D. Mass. 1997) (deciding that concurrent cause language that makes
the policy's intent reasonably clear avoids the effect of the rule which might otherwise preclude
coverage); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042, 1044-45 (Alaska 1996) (discerning no sound policy reason for preventing the enforcement of an exclusion to which the
parties have agreed); Millar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 P.2d 822, 826 (Ariz. App. 1990)
(explaining that Arizona has never adopted the efficient proximate cause rule, at least in so far as
it would operate to preclude an insurer from limiting its liability, yet an insurer may not limit its
liability if to do so would be inconsistent with public policy); Kane v. Royal Ins. Co., 768 P.2d
678, 684-86 (Colo. 1989) (stating that should the efficient proximate cause doctrine be adopted, it
must yield to the well-settled principle of law that courts will not rewrite a contract for the
parties); Ramirez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 511, 515-16 (Ind. App. 1995) (holding
that insurers may limit their liability in any manner not inconsistent with public policy, and an
unambiguous exclusionary clause is ordinarily entitled to construction and enforcement); Pakmark
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 943 S.W.2d 260, 260-61 (Mo. App. 1997) (affirming the enforcement of concurrent cause language that unambiguously excluded coverage for loss caused directly
or indirectly by flooding regardless of any sewer backup that contributed concurrently or in any
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Dakota is distinguishable from and, therefore, not bound by this authority.t 88 To draw the distinction, the court noted and ultimately agreed with
the rationale in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bongen,189 which recognized that while some states have the efficient proximate cause doctrine by
case law, others have required the doctrine's application by statute. 190
When viewed in this context, the court explained why the weight of authority for what appears to be a majority rule does not apply to the circumstances in North Dakota.191 The reasoning is that those jurisdictions that
permit insurers to contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine can
do so because there is no statute stopping them from doing so. 192
Western National attempted to sidestep this fact, however, and argued
that California interpreted its statutes this way by relying on the reasonable
expectations doctrine. 93 In response, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that it was not persuaded that the Garvey court's mention of the
reasonable expectations doctrine was the basis of the Sabella court's interpretation of the statutes, nor that it was the basis of the Howell court's
conclusion to render concurrent cause language not enforceable.t 94
Finally, the court concluded that North Dakota has "statutorily adopted
the efficient proximate cause doctrine, and a property insurer may not contractually preclude coverage when the efficient proximate cause of a loss is
a covered peril." 95 Beyond the court's presentation of its reasoning for its

sequence to the loss); Kula v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 628 N.Y.S.2d 988, 991 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (holding that the principles of causation should not be strictly applied to circumvent the
intent of the parties); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275-78 (Utah 1993)
(recognizing the efficient proximate cause doctrine only when the parties have not freely chosen
to contract out of it); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 772 (Wyo. 1988)
(quoting D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prod., Co., 207 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Wis. 1973) (holding
that despite the enormous sympathy for seemingly innocent victims, a court is restrained from
liberally and unreasonably construing an insurance contract when the effect would be to bind an
insurer to a risk that was not contemplated and for which it was not paid)).
188. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63,5 18, 643 N.W.2d 4, 12-13.
189. 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1996).
190. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 18, 643 N.W.2d at 12-13 (citing Bongen, 925 P.2d at 1044
n.3).
191. Id.
192. Id. 5 19,643 N.W.2d at 13.
193. Id. The reasonable expectations doctrine has been defined as granting courts the authority, when confronted with an adhesion contract, to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties under certain circumstances. Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah
1993); see also Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 955 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1997)
(explaining the reasonable expectations doctrine as considering what an objectively reasonable
insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered).
194. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 19,643 N.W.2d at 13.
195. Id.
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holding, the court went on further to explain why Western National's
reliance on certain cases was misplaced. 196
Western National relied on Northstar Steel, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance
Co.197 to support its contention that an unambiguous exclusion provision in
an insurance policy should control the issue of coverage.198 However, as
the court noted, the lower court's denial of coverage in Northstar stemmed
from the meaning of "rain," and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
on the basis of the trial court's finding of fact.199 Further, the concept of
efficient proximate causation or the application of sections 26.1-32-01 and
26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code was never contemplated by
the court in Northstar.200
Western National also relied on Executive Corners Office Building v.
Maryland Insurance Co.,201 where the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota concluded that concurrent cause language unambiguously excluded coverage under circumstances similar to those in
Western National.2 2 In Executive Corners, the trial court excluded coverage where damage was directly or indirectly caused by floodwater, which
was an excluded peril, despite the fact that sewer backup, which was also a
covered peril, acted concurrently in causing the loss. 203 Again, however,
the North Dakota Supreme Court was not persuaded by Executive Corners
because neither the doctrine of efficient proximate cause nor the application
of sections 26.1-32-01 and 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code
were considered. 204
Finally, Western National relied on Strausbaugh v. Heritage Mutual
Insurance Co.205 because the court in that case concluded that concurrent

196. Id. T 22.
197. 224 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1974).
198. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 22, 643 N.W.2d at 13. In Northstar, the foundation walls had
been poured and a cistern placed inside, but rain fell before the concrete floor was poured. Northstar, 224 N.W.2d at 806. The policy excluded coverage for damage caused by rain. Id. The rain
accumulated within the walls of the uncovered foundation, causing substantial damage. Id. The
North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the ordinary meaning of the term rain and affirmed the
trial court's finding of fact and denial of coverage. Id. at 807-08.
199. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 22, 643 N.W.2d at 13 (citing Northstar, 224 N.W.2d at 80708).
200. Id. (citing Northstar,224 N.W.2d at 808).
201. No. A2-98-38, 1999 WL 33283330 (D.N.D. 1999), affd without published opinion, 221
F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 2000).
202. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 23, 643 N.W.2d at 14 (citing Executive Corners, 1999 WL
33283330, at *2).
203. Executive Corners, 1999 WL 33283330, at *2.
204. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 5 23, 643 N.W.2d at 14 (citing Executive Corners, 1999 WL
33283330, at *1-2).
205. No. CIV.A.2-98-0, 1999 WL 33283346 (D.N.D. 1999).
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cause language was enforceable to deny coverage. 206 However, the Western National court noted that the facts of Strausbaugh and its exclusion
provision were distinguishable from those in Western National because
Strausbaugh had not contemplated the efficient proximate cause doctrine or
the application of sections 26.1-32-01 and 26.1-32-03.207
Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial
court did not err in adopting and applying the efficient proximate cause
doctrine and precluding Western National from contracting out of the doctrine's effect to the extent it sought to exclude coverage in a manner
contrary to the North Dakota Century Code. 208
IV. IMPACT
While the efficient proximate cause doctrine is not new, its application
in North Dakota is.209 Parties will now have to consider the efficient proximate cause, as opposed to the immediate cause, in order to assess whether
coverage is available under an insurance contract. 210 Furthermore, parties
are not allowed to contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 21'
The adoption of the efficient proximate cause doctrine, by itself, simply
requires courts to apply a different causation doctrine to a particular set of
facts than would have previously been applied. 2 12 Where a court looked to
the immediate cause before, it now looks to the proximate cause. 213

206. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., T 24, 643 N.W.2d at 14 (citing Strausbaugh, 1999 WL
33283346, at *3).
207. Id. T 25 (citing Strausbaugh, 1999 WL 33283346, at *2-4).
208. Id. T 26. While the statute stating the efficient proximate cause doctrine is not new, the
court's holding that the statute indeed does state the efficient proximate cause doctrine is new. Id.
The court addressed the other issues briefed by the parties and concluded: (1) Western National
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on UND's claim for coverage and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Western National's motion for a new trial on the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that the flood was not the
efficient proximate cause of the damage. Id. T 33, 643 N.W.2d at 16. (2) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Western National's motion for a new trial on the issue of whether
the mention of reinsurance was appropriate. Id. T 37. (3) Western National had adequate notice
of UND's expert's opinion, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Western
National's motion for a new trial on the issue of whether it was appropriate for the court to allow
the testimony of UND's expert. Id. T 40, 643 N.W.2d at 17-18. (4) The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury further on the efficient proximate cause doctrine. Id. 5 43, 643 N.W.2d at 18.
(5) UND was entitled to prejudgment interest. Id. T 47, 643 N.W.2d at 19. (6) The trial court's
award of attorney fees was appropriate. Id. T 52.
209. See id. T 20, 643 N.W.2d at 13 (holding that the efficient proximate cause doctrine has
been statutorily adopted in North Dakota and that parties may not contract out of its effect).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Therefore, the practical impact merely requires the understanding and
21 4
application of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.
However, as suggested by Rob Hovland, Chief Executive Officer and
General Counsel of Center Mutual Insurance Company, precluding parties
from contracting out of the effect of the efficient proximate cause doctrine
is where the real impact lies. 2 15 The difference between being allowed or
not allowed to contract out of the doctrine is the risk borne by either the
insurer or the insured. 216 If insurers are allowed to use concurrent cause
language, which attempts to contract out of the efficient proximate cause
doctrine, then more risk is left with the insured and the insurer has successfully limited the risk it bears. 2 17 The Howell court noted that this would
result in "giving insurance companies carte blanche to deny coverage in
nearly all cases." 218 However, if insurers are not allowed to contract out of
the efficient proximate cause doctrine, as is the result in Western National,
insurers bear more risk.219 Therefore, after Western National, it is more
difficult for insurers to limit their risk.
Mr. Hovland commented on how this affects insurers and insureds in
North Dakota.20 He explained that precluding insurance companies from
contracting out of the effect of the efficient proximate cause doctrine would
force companies to provide only limited coverage. 22 1 Even worse, he
suggested, is that "the most popular homeowners policies and many
commercial policies that provide the most and best coverage for consumers
may have to be discontinued." 222 For example, he explained that his company would no longer be able to offer sewer backup coverage if the
company was not allowed to exclude it during a flood-to contract out of the
223
risk of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.
North Dakota Insurance Commissioner, Jim Poolman, also had
thoughts about what this difficulty in limiting risk means for North

214. Id.
215. E-mail from Rob Hovland, Chief Executive Officer and General Counsel of Center
Mutual Insurance Company, to Julie Passa (Sept. 26, 2002, 12:10:40 CST) (on file with author).
216. Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1456 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (citing Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 770 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1989)).
217. Id. (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 711).
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 711).
220. E-mail from Rob Hovland, supra note 215.
221. Id.
222. Id. Such a policy is referred to as an H03 policy and provides coverage for anything
not excluded. Id.
223. Id.
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Dakota's insurance industry. 224 Commissioner Poolman explained that before Western National, "[Tlhe insurance market in North Dakota and across
the [country] was distressed." 225 The market's distress stemmed from high
numbers of weather related claims as well as a lack of investment income
from company surpluses. 226 Based on the status of the market before Western National, he found it ominously "impossible . . .to determine" what

further impact Western National would have on the marketplace. 227
Mr. Hovland echoed the sentiments of Commissioner Poolman and
categorized the industry as being in a state of crisis even before Western
National.228 He explained, "[A]fter [seven] years of losing money, last
year, the average homeowners insurance company paid out over [three
dollars] for every premium dollar received (otherwise described as losing
300%)."229

Paul E. Traynor, Senior Vice President, Secretary, and General Counsel of The Nodak Mutual Group, agreed.2 30 The international situation,
where losses were substantial, led to an increase in premiums unseen for
twenty years.2 31 Approximately ten personal insurance lines insurance
companies have left the state in the last eighteen months. 232
Mr. Traynor was also concerned with the court's application of the
efficient proximate cause doctrine to a Boiler and Machinery Policy. 233 He
contended this application was inappropriate because such policies are
usually unregulated and frequently negotiated, as opposed to perhaps homeowner's policies, which are typically more regulated contracts of adhesion. 234 This will affect such future contract negotiations by mandating the
application of the efficient proximate cause doctrine where its application
was before open to the negotiation of the parties.2 35

224. E-mail from Jim Poolman, North Dakota Insurance Commissioner, State of North
Dakota, to Julie Passa (Sept. 20, 2002, 11:30:47 CST) (on file with author).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. E-mail from Rob Hovland, supra note 215.
229. Id.
230. E-mail from Paul E. Traynor, former Secretary and General Counsel of The Nodak
Mutual Group and Professor of Insurance Law at the University of North Dakota School of Law,
to Julie Passa (Oct. 2, 2002, 03:59:55 CST) (on file with author).
231. Id.
232. E-mail from Jim Poolman, North Dakota Insurance Commissioner, State of North
Dakota, to Julie Passa (Oct. 3, 2002, 10:56:39 CST) (on file with author).
233. E-mail from Paul E. Traynor, supra note 230.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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Whether a peril acts as the efficient proximate cause has been categorized by Western National as a question of fact to be determined by the
jury. 236 Sarah Gullickson McGrane, appellate counsel for UND in Western
National, suggested that this aspect of Western National might also impact
future litigation because of the potential for jury bias.2 37 The suggestion is
that a jury may be more inclined to be sympathetic to an insured than an
insurer, which is of obvious concern to the insurance industry. 238 However,
Commissioner Poolman is confident the decision will be applied reasonably
in future cases. 239 "North Dakota is generally noted for responsible juries.
I do not necessarily believe companies need to be as fearful of resultsoriented, runaway verdicts in North Dakota as they might experience in
other states." 240
Furthermore, because an efficient proximate cause determination is a
question of fact, there also will be less certainty on how issues will be
decided in the future. 24 1 This causes insurers to have difficulty calculating
their risk and will likely increase the frequency of trials on the issue of
causation.

242

North Dakota State Senator Jerry Klein sponsored legislation intended
to refine the scope of Western National.243 Senate Bill 2224 proposed to
add the following sentence to the end of section 26.1-32-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code: "The efficient proximate cause doctrine applies only
if separate, distinct, and totally unrelated causes contribute to the loss."244
The bill also sought to add the following sentence to the end of section
26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code: "An insurer may contract
out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine." 245
Commissioner Poolman noted that future legislation could "render
[Western National] far less threatening to the insurance industry than as it
may be currently perceived." 246 For example, the proposed amendment to
section 26.1-32-01 would refine the scope of the doctrine's application so

236. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63, T 13, 643 N.W.2d 4, 12 (citing
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 715 (Cal. 1989)).
237. E-mail from Sarah Gullikson McGrane, attorney with Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt,
P.A. in Minneapolis, MN, to Julie Passa (Sept. 18, 2002, 10:36:58 CST) (on file with author).
238. Email from Jim Poolman, supra note 224.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. E-mail from Sara Gullickson McGrane, supra note 237.
243. S.B. 2224, 58th Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2003).
244. Id.
245. id.
246. E-mail from Jim Poolman, supra note 224.
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that the doctrine may not be applied where the causes occur in any relation
to each other. 247 In application of the proposed amendment, the doctrine
would not have been applicable to a case such as Western National because
it is unlikely the court would have found the floodwater and the sewer to be
separate, distinct, and totally unrelated causes. 248 In addition, the amendment to section 26.1-32-03, which sought to allow insurers to contract out
of the efficient proximate cause doctrine, allows insurers to shift back to the
insured the risk Western Nationalhas placed on the insurers. 249
The outcome of the legislation became the subject of debate during the
legislative session. 250 During a January 28, 2003 hearing before the Senate
Industry, Business, and Labor Committee, Rob Hovland and Patrick Ward
testified in support of Senate Bill 2224.251 Pending further information, the
Committee closed the hearing taking no action on the bill.252 The same
committee then approved a motion to recommend passage of Senate Bill
2224 in a February 4, 2003 committee meeting. 253
Debate of the bill among the members of the House Industry, Business,
and Labor Committee was more extensive. 254 Testimony in support of the
bill, again presented by Rob Hovland and Pat Ward, reiterated the fundamental points that passage of Senate Bill 2224 would protect the insurance
market, especially in the State of North Dakota, and also ultimately
preserve the choices available to the public in insurance policies. 255

247. E-mail from Rob Hovland, Chief Executive Officer and General Counsel of Center
Mutual Insurance Company, to Julie Passa (Jan. 30, 2003, 09:58:14 CST) (on file with author).
248. Id.
249. Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 1466-67 n.6 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (citing Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1989)).
250. Xiao Zhang, House passes bill easing doctrinefor insurance companies, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, March 11, 2003, at 4B.
251. Hearing on S.B. 2224 Before the Senate Industry, Business and Labor Comm., 58th
Legis. Assemb. 3 (N.D. Jan. 28, 2003) (testimony of Patrick Ward in Support of S.B. 2224 in
Senate IBL). Patrick Ward, an attorney with Zuger, Kirmis & Smith in Bismarck, ND, spoke on
behalf of North Dakota Domestic Insurance Companies. Id.
252. Hearing on S.B. 2224 Before the Senate Industry, Business and Labor Comm., 58th
Legis. Assemb. 3 (N.D. Jan. 28, 2003).
253. Hearing on S.B. 2224 Before the Senate Industry, Business and Labor Comm., 58th
Legis. Assemb. 3 (N.D. Feb. 4, 2003).The motion was approved by a vote of five to one, with one
abstention. Id.
254. See generally Hearing on S.B. 2224 Before the House Industry, Business and Labor
Comm., 58th Legislative Assembly (N.D. March 4, 2003) (hearing testimony both in support of
and in opposition to the bill).
255. Hearing on S.B. 2224 Before the House Industry, Business and Labor Comm., 58th
Legislative Assembly I (N.D. March 4, 2003). One question raised by Representative Ekstrom
during Hovland's testimony relayed a concern expressed by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) that the legislation would result in private insurance companies "[stepping] back
completely," thereby leaving more for FEMA to deal with. Id.
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Testimony in opposition to the bill was also offered from Paula Grossinger, representing North Dakota Trial Lawyers Association, and David
Bliss, an attorney with Olson Cichy Attorneys in Bismarck, ND.256 Grossinger indicated that the proposed additional language to section 26.1-32-01,
requiring that the efficient proximate cause doctrine only be applied when
separate, distinct, and totally unrelated causes contribute to the loss, would
leave too much discretion with the insurers to find that something was a
related cause and therefore the insurer would not have to provide coverage. 257 Bliss noted that while the legislation would indeed transform a currently gray area into a more black and white one, it does so to the benefit of
the insurer, not the insured. 258 Further, it was his opinion that the gray area
was already being adequately addressed by the efficient proximate cause
259
doctrine as it existed.
On March 5, 2003, the House Industry, Business, and Labor Committee approved a motion to recommend passage of S.B. 2224.260 The bill was
passed by a vote of forty-nine to forty-one on March 10, 2003261 and signed
262
into law by the Governor two weeks later.
V. CONCLUSION
In Western National, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that North
Dakota has statutorily adopted the efficient proximate cause doctrine in
263
sections 26.1-32-01 and 26.1-32-03 of the North Dakota Century Code.
The court concluded that an insurer may not contractually exclude coverage
when a covered peril is the efficient proximate cause of damage, even if an
excluded peril contributed to the damage. 264 This result can be largely
attributed to the fact that in North Dakota, the doctrine is mandated by
statute as opposed to a judicially established doctrine subject to the court's
modification. 265 Now, due to the passage of S.B. 2224 during the 2003

256. Id. at 4-9.
257. Id. at 5-6. She suggests that the legislation allows insurers to create insurance contracts

with "illusory" coverage because an insurer "could say that anything is related" once given this
broad range of interpretation with causation. Id. at 6.
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id. at 7.
260. Hearing on S.B. 2224 Before the House Industry, Business and Labor Comm., 58th
Legislative Assembly 4 (N.D. March 5, 2003).
261. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 836 (58th Leg. 2003).
262. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 905 (58th Leg. 2003).

263. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 2002 ND 63,5 20, 643 N.W.2d 4, 13.
264. Id.
265. Id. 1 18, 643 N.W.2d at 13.
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legislative session, the exact opposite is true; an insurer may now indeed
contract out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine. 266
The efficient proximate cause doctrine, absent the changes made legislatively, would have been applied to determine the existence of insurance
coverage for property damage where an excluded peril and a covered peril
contribute to the damage. 267 Now the doctrine will only be applied where
the causes are separate, distinct, and totally unrelated. 268
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